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Abstract
Consider an agent taking two successive decisions to maximize his expected utility
under uncertainty. After his first decision, a signal is revealed that provides information
about the state of nature. The observation of the signal allows the decision-maker to
revise his prior and the second decision is taken accordingly. Assuming that the first
decision is a scalar representing consumption, the precautionary effect holds when
initial consumption is less in the prospect of future information than without (no
signal). Epstein in (Epstein, 1980) has provided the most operative tool to exhibit
the precautionary effect. Epstein’s Theorem holds true when the difference of two
convex functions is either convex or concave, which is not a straightforward property,
and which is difficult to connect to the primitives of the economic model. Our main
contribution consists in giving a geometric characterization of when the difference of
two convex functions is convex, then in relating this to the primitive utility model.
With this tool, we are able to study and unite a large body of the literature on the
precautionary effect.
Key words: value of information; uncertainty; learning; precautionary effect;
support function.
JEL Classification: D83
1 Introduction
Consider an agent taking two successive decisions to maximize his expected utility under
uncertainty. As illustrated in Figure 1, after his first decision, a signal is revealed that
provides information about the state of nature. The observation of the signal allows the
decision-maker to revise his prior and the second decision is taken accordingly. Assuming
that the first decision is a scalar representing consumption, the precautionary effect holds
when initial consumption is less in the prospect of future information than without (no
signal).
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second decision b
Figure 1: Decision with learning; agent takes decision a; a signal is revealed; agent takes
decision b accordingly.
The example above is a stereotype of sequential decisions problems with learning were
focus is put on comparison of the optimal initial decisions with different information struc-
tures. For instance, should we aim at more reductions of current greenhouse gases emissions
today whether or not we assume some future improvement of our knowledge about the cli-
mate? Economic analysis has identified effects that go in opposite directions and make the
conclusion elusive. This article proposes a characterization of utility functions such that the
precautionary effect holds for all signals.
Seminal literature in environmental economics ((Arrow and Fisher, 1974), (Henry, 1974a,b))
focused on the irreversible environmental consequences carried by the initial decision and
showed that the possiblity of learning should lead to less irreversible current decisions
(“irreversibility effect”). Henry; Arrow and Fisher consider additive separable preferences,
and so do (Freixas and Laffont, 1984), (Fisher and Hanemann, 1987), (Hanemann, 1989).
Epstein in (Epstein, 1980) studies a more general nonseparable expected utility model,
and derives a condition that identifies the direction of the precautionary effect. His con-
tribution remains the most operative tool. Yet, the conditions under which this result
holds are difficult to connect to the primitive utility model. Further contributions have
insisted on the existence of an opposite economic irreversibility since environmental precau-
tion imply sunk costs that may constrain future consumption ((Kolstad, 1996), (Pindyck,
2000), (Fisher and Narain, 2003)). Risk neutral preferences are studied in (Ulph and Ulph,
1997) for a global warming model. Assuming time separability of preferences, the papers
(Gollier, Jullien, and Treich, 2000) and (Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Treich, 2005) examine risk
averse preferences. Gollier, Jullien, and Treich identified conditions on the second-period
utility function for the possibility of learning to have a precautionary effect with and alter-
natively without the irreversibility constraint. By this latter, we mean that the domain of
the second decision variable depends on the first decision.
The driving idea for linking the effect of learning and the value of information is the
observation that, once an initial decision is made, the value of information can be defined
as a function of that decision. This is the approach of Jones and Ostroy who define the
value of information in this way in their paper (Jones and Ostroy, 1984) where they for-
malize the notion of flexibility in a sequential decision context, and relate its value to the
amount of information an agent expects to receive. Whenever the second-period value of in-
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formation – namely the value of information measured after an initial commitment is made
– is a monotone function of the initial decision, optimal initial decisions can be ranked.
All this is recalled in Sect. 2, where we also extend the approach in (Epstein, 1980) and
(Jones and Ostroy, 1984) to non necessarily finite sets.
In (Jones and Ostroy, 1984), the monotonicity property of the second-period value of
information is related to convexity in the prior of a difference of maximal payoffs. This is
convexity is far from being granted since the difference of two convex functions is generally
not convex. Our main result consist in giving a general condition under which a difference
of maximal payoffs exhibits convexity in the prior. This is the object of Sect. 3 where, first,
we provide a geometric characterization and, second, carry it to the utility model. With
this tool, we are able to study in Sect. 4 a large body of the literature on the precautionary
effect.
2 The precautionary effect: statement and recalls
We first give a formal statement of the precautionary effect, then recall and extend some
results in the literature, upon which we shall elaborate our main contribution in the next
section.
We shall assume that all sets are Borel spaces, endowed with the Borel σ-algebra gener-
ated by the open subsets, that all mappings have appropriate measurability and integrability
properties needed to perform mathematical expectations operations, and that all probabil-
ities are regular to ensure the existence of conditional distributions (Bertsekas and Shreve,
1996), (Kallenberg, 2002).
2.1 Problem statement
Consider an agent taking two successive decisions as in Figure 1. The initial decision a is a
scalar belonging to an interval I of R; the following and final decision b belongs to a set B(a)
which may depend on the initial decision1 a (B(a) is a subset of a fixed set B). Uncertainty is
represented by states of nature ω ∈ Ω with prior P on the Borel σ-field F, and by a random
variable X : (Ω,F) → (X,X). Partial information on X is provided by means of a signal
(random variable) Y : (Ω,F) → (Y,Y). A utility function U(a, b, x) is given, defined on
I× B× Ω. The expected utility maximizer solves2
max
a∈I
E
[
max
b∈B(a)
E[U
(
a, b,X
)
| Y ]
]
. (1)
Thus, the second decision b is taken knowing Y .
1This may materialize “irreversibility” of the initial decision.
2We shall always assume that, for the problems we consider, the sup is attained and we shall use the
notation max.
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The evaluation of expected utility right after the first decision a has been taken is con-
ditional on the signal Y and defined as follows:
V
Y (a) := E
[
max
b∈B(a)
E[U
(
a, b,X
)
| Y ]
]
. (2)
With this notation, the program of the Y -informed agent is maxaV
Y (a). Let us assume, for
the sake of simplicity, that an optimal solution exists and is unique, denoted by a¯Y .
A signal Y is said to be more informative than a signal Y ′ if the σ-field σ(Y ) := Y −1(Y)
contains σ(Y ′). It is equivalent to say that Y ′ is a measurable function of Y , namely Y ′ =
f(Y ) where f : (Y,Y)→ (Y′,Y′).
The precautionary effect is said to hold whenever the optimal initial decision is lower
with more information that is, if when the signal Y is more informative than the signal Y ′,
then a¯Y ≤ a¯Y
′
.
2.2 Precautionary effect and second-period value of the informa-
tion monotonicity
We shall recall a sufficient condition under which the presence of learning affects the first
optimal decision in a predictable way (see (Jones and Ostroy, 1984), (De Lara and Doyen,
2008, p.229), (De Lara and Gilotte, 2009)).
Let us compare the programs of the Y -informed and Y ′-informed agent by writing
max
a
V
Y (a) = max
a
{VY
′
(a) +
(
V
Y (a)− VY
′
(a)
)
} . (3)
It appears that the decision maker who expects more information optimizes the same objec-
tive as the less informed decision maker plus what we shall coin the second-period value of
information
∆VY Y
′
(a) := VY (a)− VY
′
(a) (4)
which depends on his initial decision. The more-informed agent initial optimal decision
achieves a trade-off: it can be suboptimal from the point of view of the less-informed decision
maker but compensates for this by an increase of the second-period value of information.
Proposition 1 Assume that the programs maxaV
Y (a) and maxaV
Y ′(a) have unique3 opti-
mal solutions a¯Y and a¯Y
′
. Whenever the second-period value of the information is a decreas-
ing function of the initial decision, namely
∆VY Y
′
: a 7→ VY (a)− VY
′
(a) is decreasing, (5)
3Unicity is for the sake of simplicity. If the programs maxa V
Y (a) and maxa V
Y
′
(a) do not have unique
optimal solutions, denote by argmaxa V
Y (a) and argmaxa V
Y
′
(a) the sets of maximizers. If ∆VY (a) is
decreasing, the upper bounds of these sets can be ranked: sup argmaxa V
Y (a) ≤ sup argmaxa V
Y
′
(a). If
∆VY (a) is strictly decreasing, we obtain that sup argmaxa V
Y (a) ≤ inf argmaxa V
Y
′
(a) that is, a¯Y ≤ a¯Y
′
for any a¯Y ∈ argmaxa V
Y (a) and any a¯Y
′
∈ argmaxa V
Y
′
(a).
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then
a¯Y ≤ a¯Y
′
. (6)
In the case where Y ′ is constant (no information since σ(Y ′) is the trivial σ-field {∅,Ω}),
the effect of learning is precautionary in the sense that the optimal initial decision is lower
with information than without.
2.3 Second-period value of information and Epstein functional
We extend the approach of Epstein in (Epstein, 1980) and (Jones and Ostroy, 1984) to non
necessarily finite sets. We denote by P(X) the Borel space of probability measures on X,
with its Borel σ-field; the same holds for P(Y).
Following Epstein, let us define what we shall coin the Epstein functional by4:
J(a, ρ) := sup
b∈B(a)
Eρ
[
U
(
a, b, ·
)]
= sup
b∈B(a)
∫
X
U
(
a, b, x
)
dρ(x) , ∀ρ ∈ P(X) . (7)
Denote by ν and ν ′ the unconditional distributions of the signals Y and Y ′ on their image
set Y. The conditional distribution of X knowing Y is a mapping PYX : Y→ P(X).
The following result may be found in (Jones and Ostroy, 1984). We give its proof in the
general case of non necessarily finite sets.
Proposition 2 Assume that
1. for any pair of initial decisions a1 ≥ a0, ρ ∈ P(X) 7→ J(a1, ρ) − J(a0, ρ) is convex
(resp. concave),
2. Y is more informative than Y ′.
Then, the value ∆VY Y
′
(a) = VY (a) − VY
′
(a) of substituting Y for Y ′, is increasing (resp.
decreasing) with initial decision a ∈ I. Hence, Proposition 1 applies.
Proof. We have:
V
Y (a) = EP
[
max
b∈B(a)
EP[U
(
a, b,X
)
| Y ]
]
by definition (2)
= Eν
[
max
b∈B(a)
E
P
Y
X
[U
(
a, b, ·
)
]
]
by using the conditional distribution
= Eν
[
J(a,PYX)
]
by (7).
Let a1 ≥ a0, and suppose that ϕ(ρ) = J(a1, ρ)− J(a0, ρ) is convex in ρ ∈ P(X). We have
∆VY Y
′
(a1)−∆V
Y Y ′(a0) = Eν
[
J(a1,P
Y
X)− J(a0,P
Y
X)
]
− Eν′
[
J(a1,P
Y ′
X )− J(a0,P
Y ′
X )
]
= Eν
[
ϕ(PYX)
]
− Eν′
[
ϕ(PY
′
X )
]
≥ 0
since Y is more informative than Y ′. Indeed, it is known (see (Dellacherie and Meyer, 1975),
(Artstein and Wets, 1993), (Artstein, 1999)) that if Y is more informative than Y ′, then Eν [ϕ(P
Y
X)] ≥
Eν′ [ϕ(P
Y ′
X )] for all convex function ϕ on P(X).
5 The converse holds for concave. ✷
4We denote by U(a, b, ·) the mapping X→ R given by x 7→ U(a, b, x).
5Notice that Eν [] denotes a mathematical expectation taken on the probability space (Y,Y, ν).
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3 Conditions on the primitive utility for the precau-
tionary effect
Epstein’s condition for the precautionary effect in (Epstein, 1980) relies upon convexity
(or concavity) of ρ 7→ ∂J
∂a
(a¯Y , ρ). In the same vein, Jones and Ostroy rely upon convexity
of the mapping ρ ∈ P(X) 7→ J(a1, ρ) − J(a0, ρ) in (Jones and Ostroy, 1984). With the
expression (7) of J(a, ρ), it is not easy to see how this relates to the primitive of the model,
namely the utility U .
We shall proceed in two steps to characterize utility functions such that ρ ∈ P(X) 7→
J(a1, ρ) − J(a0, ρ) is convex. The difficulty comes from the fact that this latter function is
the difference of two convex functions, hence has no reason to be convex. We shall, first,
provide a geometric characterization and, second, carry it functionally to the utility model
by means of so-called support functions.
3.1 A geometric characterization
The following characterization of when ρ ∈ P(X) 7→ J(a1, ρ)− J(a0, ρ) is convex relies upon
the notion of sum of subsets of a vector space. Recall that, for any subsets Λ1 and Λ2 of a
vector space, Λ1 + Λ2 = {x1 + x2 , x1 ∈ Λ1 and x2 ∈ Λ2} is their so called direct sum, or
Minkowsky sum.
Let us define, for any initial decision a ∈ I,
Λ−(a) := {f : X→ R | there exists b ∈ B(a) such that f(x) ≤ U(a, b, x) , ∀x ∈ X} (8)
the set of maximal possible random rewards when the initial decision is a. Our first main
result is the following.
Proposition 3 Let a1 > a0. If there exists a subset K of functions defined on X such that
Λ−(a1) = Λ
−(a0) +K , (9)
then ρ ∈ P(X) 7→ J(a1, ρ) − J(a0, ρ) is convex. Hence, the first hypothesis of Proposition 2
is satisfied.
Proof. The proof comes from the observation that the Epstein functional J(a, ρ) is a so-called
support function6 as a function of its argument ρ. Recall that, to any set Λ of bounded measurable
functions f : X → R is attached the support function σΛ, defined on the Banach space of finite
signed measures on X, by:
σΛ(ρ) := sup
λ∈Λ
∫
X
λ(x)dρ(x) . (10)
Indeed, (7) may be written as
J(a, ρ) = sup
b∈B(a)
Eρ
[
U
(
a, b, ·
)]
= sup
λ∈Λ(a)
Eρ
[
λ
]
= σΛ(a)(ρ) , (11)
6It is well known that an expected utility is convex in the prior. It seems less noticed that the expected
utility, seen as a function of the prior, is the support function of the set of payoffs indexed by actions.
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where
Λ(a) := {f : X→ R | there exists b ∈ B(a) such that f(x) = U(a, b, x) , ∀x ∈ X} . (12)
Now, since ρ belongs to cone of positive measures (ρ ∈ P(X)), we also have that J(a, ρ) = σΛ(a)(ρ) =
σΛ−(a)(ρ), because the polar cone of nonnegative functions on X is the set of measures (Aubin, 1982,
p.31,p.107).
Support functions have the nice property to transform a Minkowsky sum into a sum of functions
(Aubin, 1982):
σΛ1+Λ2 = σΛ1 + σΛ1 . (13)
Thus, whenever Λ−(a1) = Λ
−(a0) +K, we obtain that
J(a1, ρ)− J(a0, ρ) = σΛ−(a1)(ρ)− σΛ−(a0)(ρ)
= σΛ−(a0)+K(ρ)− σΛ−(a0)(ρ)
= σΛ−(a0)(ρ) + σK(ρ)− σΛ−(a0)(ρ) = σK(ρ) .
Hence, ρ 7→ J(a1, ρ)− J(a0, ρ) = σK(ρ) is convex since it is a support function.
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✷
3.2 Characterization of utility functions ensuring the precaution-
ary effect
We shall now show how the above geometric characterization (9) translates into a condition
on the utility function U .
Consider two initial decisions a1 > a0. To any mapping φ : B(a0) → B(a1) between
second decision sets, associate the following set of minimizers
Bφ(a1, a0, x) := argmin
b∈B(a0)
(
U(a1, φ(b), x)− U(a0, b, x)
)
, ∀x ∈ X . (14)
and
Bφ(a1, a0) :=
⋂
x∈X
Bφ(a1, a0, x) . (15)
When this latter set is not empty, there exists at least one minimizer b ∈ B(a0) of U(a1, φ(b), x)−
U(a0, b, x) independent of the alea x. Our second main result is the following.
Proposition 4 Assume that
1. the set Φ(a1, a0) := {φ : B(a0)→ B(a1) | Bφ(a1, a0) 6= ∅} is not empty,
7The condition Λ−(a1) = Λ
−(a0)+K is almost necessary for J(a1, ρ)−J(a0, ρ) to be convex in ρ ∈ P(X).
Indeed, (Hiriart-Urrurty and Lemare´chal, 1993, p. 92-93) states that the closed convex hull co(σΛ2 − σΛ1 ) is
equal to σ
Λ2
⋆
−Λ1
, where the star-difference Λ2
⋆
− Λ1 := {x | x+Λ1 ⊂ Λ2}. Recall that the closed convex hull
cof of a function f minorized by an affine function is the largest closed convex function minorizing f .
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2. to any b1 ∈ B(a1) can be associated at least one φ ∈ Φ(a1, a0) and one b0 ∈ Bφ(a1, a0)
such that b1 = φ(b0).
Then there exists a subset K of functions defined on X such that Λ−(a1) = Λ
−(a0) + K.
Hence, the assumption of Proposition 3 is satisfied.
Proof. Let us define the set of functions K = ∪φ∈Φ(a1,a0)Kφ, where
Kφ = {x ∈ X 7→ U(a1, φ(b), x) − U(a0, b, x) for b ∈ Bφ(a1, a0)} . (16)
1. We first show the inclusion Λ−(a1) ⊃ Λ
−(a0) + K. Indeed, for any φ ∈ Φ(a1, a0) and
b ∈ B(a0), we have by definition of Kφ and Bφ(a1, a0):
k(x) ≤ U(a1, φ(b), x) − U(a0, b, x) , ∀x ∈ X , ∀k ∈ Kφ .
Hence, k(x)+U(a0, b, x) ≤ U(a1, φ(b), x). Thus, Λ(a0)+K ⊂ Λ
−(a1), and therefore Λ
−(a0)+
K ⊂ Λ−(a1).
2. We now show the reverse inclusion Λ−(a1) ⊂ Λ
−(a0) +K. Let b1 ∈ B(a1). By assumption,
there exist φ ∈ Φ(a1, a0) and b0 ∈ Bφ(a1, a0) such that b1 = φ(b0). We have that
U(a1, b1, x) = U(a1, φ(b0), x) = U(a0, b0, x) + U(a1, φ(b0), x)− U(a0, b0, x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k(x)
(17)
where the function k belongs to Kφ since b0 ∈ Bφ(a1, a0).
✷
The following Corollary provides practical conditions on the utility function U which
ensure that the assumptions of Propositions 4 and 3 are satisfied, hence that the first
hypothesis of Proposition 2 is satisfied.
What is more, the first-order condition (19) has proximities with the second-order one in
(Salanie´ and Treich, 2007). This opens the way for comparison between our approach and
the invariance approach of Salanie´ and Treich.
Corollary 5 Assume that the second decision variable b belongs to B = Rn and that the
minimizers in (14) are characterized by the first-order optimality condition
φ′(b)
∂U
∂b
(a1, φ(b), x)−
∂U
∂b
(a0, b, x) = 0 , ∀x ∈ X . (18)
Suppose that, to any vector b1 ∈ B(a1) can be associated at least one vector b0 ∈ B(a0) and
one square matrix M ∈ Rn×n such that
M
∂U
∂b
(a1, b1, x)−
∂U
∂b
(a0, b0, x) = 0 , ∀x ∈ X . (19)
If, in addition, we have b1 +M(b− b0) ∈ B(a1) for all b in a neighbourhood of b0 in B(a0),
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then the assumptions of Proposition 4 are satisfied.
8This condition is meaningless if b1 belongs to the interior of B(a0). Hence this condition has to be
verified only when an irreversibility constraint bites.
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Proof. By assumption, to any b1 ∈ B(a1) can be associated at least one mapping defined by
φ(b) = b1+M(b−b0) in a neighbourhood of b0 (and smoothly prolongated outside). The first-order
optimality condition (18) attached to (14) admits the solution b = b0 by (19).
✷
4 Analysis of examples in the literature
We shall examine a large body of the literature, and see that Corollary 5 applies in all cases
and explains the precautionary effect.
At first, we shall assume that the second decision set B(a) = B does not depend on the
initial decision a, to concentrate on the precautionary effect and to try to disentangle it from
the irreversibility effect. Second, we shall relax this assumption and attempt to point out
the impact that the second decision set B(a) indeed depends upon the initial decision a.
In the sequel, we consider two initial decisions a1 > a0.
4.1 Additive separable preferences
The case of additive separable preferences may be found in (Arrow and Fisher, 1974), (Henry,
1974a), (Epstein, 1980), (Freixas and Laffont, 1984), (Fisher and Hanemann, 1987), (Hanemann,
1989) and is formalized by
U(a, b, x) = u(a, x) + v(b, x) .
It can be seen that Λ(a) defined in (12) may be written as
Λ(a1) = {u(a1, x)+v(b, x) , b ∈ B} = u(a1, x)−u(a0, x)+{u(a0, x)+v(b, x) , b ∈ B} = K+Λ(a0)
where K is the singleton {u(a1, x)−u(a0, x)}. Hence J(a1, ρ)−J(a0, ρ) = σu(a1,x)−u(a0,x)(ρ) =∫
X
(
u(a1, x)− u(a0, x)
)
dρ(x) is linear in the prior ρ, hence both concave and convex. Thus,
the precautionary effect holds true in a strong sense since the initial optimal decision does
not depend on the amount of information the agent expects to receive.
The above analysis is confirmed by the first-order optimality condition (19) which is
M
∂v
∂b
(b1, x) =
∂v
∂b
(b0, x) , ∀x ∈ X .
Since M = Idn×n and b0 = b1 are solutions, the precautionary effect holds true.
However, when B(a) indeed depends upon a, we no longer have that Λ(a1) = K +Λ(a0).
We also observe that the additional conditions of Corollary 5 related to the irreversibility
constraints, namely B(a1) ⊂ B(a0) and b1 ∈ B(a1) for all b in a neighborhood of b1 ∈ B(a0),
are not generaly satisfied and this may prevent the precautionary effect to hold true.
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4.2 Risk neutral preferences
Examples in (Epstein, 1980; Ulph and Ulph, 1997) present the general structure
U(a, b, x) = u(a, b) + v(a, b)x = u(a, b) +
p∑
i=1
vi(a, b)xi .
The first-order optimality condition (19) is

M
∂u
∂b
(a1, b1) =
∂u
∂b
(a0, b0)
M
∂vi
∂b
(a1, b1) =
∂vi
∂b
(a0, b0) , i = 1, . . . , p .
This is a system of n+np equations with n+n2 unknown (M, b0). Thus, when the dimension
p of the noise is less than the dimension n of the second decision variable, the precautionary
effect generally holds true.
4.3 Risk averse preferences
We shall examine three models where preferences exhibit risk aversion.
A consumption-savings problem (Epstein, 1980)
A two-periods consumption-savings problem is modelled by
U(a, b, x) = u1(w − a) + βu2(ra− b) + β
2u3(bx) ,
with savings a, b, and irreversibility constraint B(a) = [0, ra].
The first-order optimality condition (19) is
Mβxu′3(b1x)− βxu
′
3(b0x) = Mu
′
2(ra1 − b1)− u
′
2(ra0 − b0) , ∀x ∈ X .
If there exists a solution (M, b0), this implies that there must exist constants α, γ and δ such
that u′3 satisfies an equation of the form
xu′3(αx) = γxu
′
3(x) + δ , ∀x ∈ X .
A candidate is u′3(x) = x
−γ, yielding a solution M = γ and b0 = αb1, with the compatibility
condition γu′2(ra1 − b1)− u
′
2(ra0 − αb1) + δ = 0. Hence, the precautionary effect holds true.
Global warming and emissions (Gollier, Jullien, and Treich, 2000)
With pollution emissions a, b, a two-periods model with benefits and costs of emitting pol-
lutions is modelled by
U(a, b, x) = u(a) + v
(
b− x(a+ b)
)
.
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The first-order optimality condition (19) is
Mv′
(
b1 − x(a1 + b1)
)
= v′
(
b0 − x(a0 + b0)
)
, ∀x ∈ X .
If there exists a solution (M, b0), this implies that there must exist constants α, β and M
such that v′ satisfies an equation of the form
v′(αx+ β) = Mv′(x) , ∀x ∈ X .
In this case, b0 = b1a0/a1. The utility v(x) =
γ
1−γ
[
η + x
γ
]1−γ
in (Gollier, Jullien, and Treich,
2000) precisely satisfies v′(αx+γη(α−1)) = α−γv′(x), which explains why the precautionary
effect holds true.
Eating a cake with unknown size (Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Treich, 2005)
The following model from (Eeckhoudt, Gollier, and Treich, 2005) is qualified of the problem
of “eating a cake with unknown size” in (Salanie´ and Treich, 2007):
U(a, b, x) = u(a) + v(b) + w(x− a− b) .
The first-order optimality condition (19) is
Mv′(b1)− v
′(b0) = Mw
′(x− (a1 + b1))− w
′(x− (a0 + b0)) .
If there exists a solution (M, b0), this implies that there must exist constants β, κ and M
such that w′ satisfies an equation of the form w′(x + β) = Mv′(x) + κ. Then, we find that
β + a1 + b1 = a0 + b0 and that Mv
′(b1) − v
′(b0) + κ = 0. Thus, β, κ and M must satisfy
some compatibility constraint, so that the precautionary effect holds true.
5 Conclusion
We have provided general conditions for the precautionary effect to hold true, including
a condition that bears directly on the primitive utility of the economic model. We have
examined a large body of the literature, and seen how operative is this condition to explain
the precautionary effect. Preferences yielding the precautionary effect for all signals appear to
belong to a restricted class. This is related to the strong conditions, that we provide, needed
to have a difference of maximal payoffs exhibit convexity in the prior. The connexion with
the invariance approach of (Salanie´ and Treich, 2007) deserves to be studied and clarified.
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